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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
The appellees adopt by reference the statement of
jurisdiction in the appellant's Brief.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Whether the plaintiff must return cash payments of

$5,170.51 to the Allstate Insurance Company as a condition
precedent to pursuing this action.
2.

Whether the acceptance and negotiation by

plaintiff of the sum of $5,170.51 from the Allstate Insurance
Company acted as an accord and satisfaction of all her claims.
The two issues involve conclusions of law.

The

district court's conclusion of law is given no particular weight
by this court and is reviewed with a "correction of error"
standard.

LDS Hospital

v.

Capitol

Life

Insurance

Co.,

765 P.2d

857 (Utah 1988).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
None.

1

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff has included many allegations from her
Complaint as statements of fact.
record.

There are very few facts on the

The following are the facts that are on the record or

are not contested.
Plaintiff and defendant John W. Betteridge were
involved in an automobile accident on August 25, 1988.

Defendant

George G. Betteridge is the father of defendant John W.
Betteridge.

(TR 10)

The plaintiff incurred medical expenses of $3,269.39 as
a result of the accident.

The plaintiff had been issued an

automobile insurance policy by the Farmer's Insurance Company.
Farmers paid the plaintiffs medical expenses.

(TR 11, 18)

The defendants were insured by the Allstate Insurance
Company.

Allstate Adjuster Andra Hogan contacted the plaintiff.

Ms. Hogan and the plaintiff had several discussions about the
plaintiff's injuries and the details of how the accident
occurred. (TR 18, 19)
Ms. Hogan and the plaintiff eventually reached an
agreement.

Ms. Hogan agreed to pay Farmer's the sum of

$3,262.39.

She also agreed to give the plaintiff a check for

$4,500.00 for her general damages, plus pay her additional
medical expenses totalling $670.51.
2

(TR 11, 18)

The plaintiff was given a check for $5,170.51 dated
"1/5/90."

The check stated that it was for a "final settlement

of any and all claims arising from bodily injury caused by
accident on 08/21/88."

(TR 38)

In addition, the plaintiff was

given an Allstate Insurance Company form entitled "Release of All
Claims."

This Release of All Claims stated that it was intended

to "release and forever discharge" all of the plaintiff's claims
relating to the accident in question.

(TR 24)

asked to sign and return the release.

She cashed the check.

never returned the release.

The plaintiff was
She

(TR 19, 25)

On November 26, 1990, the plaintiff filed suit and
named John and George Betteridge as defendants.

The plaintiff's

Complaint alleged that the defendants were negligent and sought
general damages in the sum of $1,000,000.00.

(TR 1, 2)

The defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on
December 18, 1990.
liability.

In the motion the defendants did not admit

They also did not admit that the plaintiff had

suffered damages in any certain amount.

(TR 8-16)

On April 15, 1991, the Honorable Scott Daniels denied
defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, on the condition that
the plaintiff repay the sum of $5,170.51 plus interest in a
timely manner.

The court then added that if repayment was made

3

that the issue of accord and satisfaction would be severed from
the personal injury claim and "tried forthwith."

(TR 39, 40)

The plaintiff filed a Motion for a New Trial seeking to
have the court reconsider its prior ruling.

On August 15, 1991,

the Honorable Scott Daniels denied the plaintiff's Motion for a
New Trial, and added that his prior order was incorrect and was
partially rescinded.

The court ruled that there was no need for

a trial on the issue of accord and satisfaction, but instead gave
the plaintiff the option of keeping the money, or setting aside
the accord and satisfaction and repaying $5,170.51 plus interest
to Allstate.

The order noted that if this amount was not repaid

that the matter would be dismissed.

(TR 41, 78, 79)

The plaintiff failed to tender the required sum and on
January 23, 1991, the court entered an order dismissing the
plaintiff's Complaint.

(TR 85)

4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Judge Daniels' ruling provided the plaintiff with a
choice.

This choice was to either repay the money and commence

litigation, or keep the money and have the case dismissed.
choice included all possible outcomes.

This

As such, his ruling

reflected all the possible outcomes and therefore it was the most
expeditious way to resolve this matter.
This is an unliquidated claim.

All authority regarding

unliquidated claims, none of which is from the Utah courts,
support the proposition that in personal injury claims,
settlement funds must be repaid before litigation can be
commenced.

The plaintiff's authority all relates to unliquidated

and undisputed claims. Where an amount of a claim is not in
dispute as to a certain sum, that sum can be retained by a
plaintiff before a suit is commenced.
The plaintiff's claim that the Utah Constitution was
violated is without support.

This condition precedent is similar

to that used in many other situations.
This court can affirm Judge Daniels' decision for the
reason that the parties reached an accord and satisfaction.
There was a meeting of the minds, by competent parties, on a
proper subject matter, and consideration was given.

All elements

of an accord and satisfaction were therefore satisfied.
5

ARGUMENT
POINT I
JUDGE DANIEL'S SECOND RULING WAS THE MOST EXPEDITIOUS
WAY TO RESOLVE THIS CASE
Plaintiff Ethel Ashworth and defendant John Betteridge
were involved in an automobile accident•

The Betteridges were

insured by the Allstate Insurance Company.

Allstate Adjuster

Andra Hogan reached an agreement with plaintiff Ethel Ashworth.
As part of this agreement, Allstate issued two checks to Ethel
Ashworth.

She was also given a Release of All Claims form.

was asked to sign and return this form.

She

She cashed the checks.

To date she has never signed the release.
Approximately 10% months later, the plaintiff through
her now counsel of record, Wendell Abies, filed suit against Mr.
Betteridge and his father.

The suit was for damages resulting

from the personal injuries Ms. Ashworth allegedly incurred in the
accident.
The defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss based on the
doctrine of accord and satisfaction.

Judge Scott Daniels

initially denied the motion on the condition that the plaintiff
return the money she received from Allstate.

Judge Daniels

stated that since there was a dispute as to whether the parties
had reached an accord and satisfaction, that he would hold a
separate trial on this issue.
6

The plaintiff then filed a Motion for a New Trial.
Judge Daniels reconsidered his prior ruling and entered an order
on August 15, 1991, clarifying his earlier ruling.

Judge Daniel

noted that his order of April 15, 1991 was incorrect in that it
discussed the necessity of holding a tria] on the issue of accord
and satisfaction.

He noted that this was not his intention, but

instead, since there was a dispute as to whether or not there was
an accord and satisfaction, and/or the plaintiff wanted to
rescind this agreement, that he would allow her to go forward
with this action if she merely repaid the settlement funds.
Judge Daniels7 August 15, 1991 order was the most
expeditious way to resolve the defendants' motion.

It was the

most expeditious way because the plaintiff would be required to
repay the funds no matter which way the judge ruled on the accord
and satisfaction issue.
The plaintiff claimed there was no accord and
satisfaction.

If there was no accord and satisfaction, then she

was not entitled to keep the funds and they should be returned to
Allstate.

By doing so, both the parties would be put in the

position they were in prior to the start of the negotiations.
If the defendants were correct and there was an accord
and satisfaction, yet the judge allowed the plaintiff to rescind
the accord and satisfaction, then she would still need to repay
7

the money.

After rescinding the settlement and returning the

funds, the parties would be put in the same position they were in
prior to the start of the negotiations.
The only remaining option was for the court to enter an
order stating there was an accord and satisfaction, allow the
plaintiff to retain her money, and dismiss the case.

This was

one of the choices Judge Daniels included in the order, and the
result that occurred, as the plaintiff elected not to repay the
money.

Therefore the accord and satisfaction stayed in place,

and the plaintiff and defendants received the benefits of their
bargain.
Judge Daniels could have taken evidence and then
entered a ruling on the validity of the accord and satisfaction.
Instead, he accepted the plaintiff's argument that there was no
meeting of the minds, and allowed her the choice of determining
whether the accord and satisfaction should stay in place, or
whether she wanted to rescind it and start over.

The plaintiff

made her election by not repaying the funds. Thus, Judge Daniels
saved the litigants the time and expense of holding the accord
and satisfaction trial by entering his August 21, 1991 order.

8

POINT II
A PLAINTIFF MUST REPAY ANY
UNLIQUIDATED SUM IN DAMAGES BEFORE
COMMENCING AN ACTION
The Utah courts have never dealt with the issue of
whether a plaintiff must return settlement funds paid for an
unliquidated claim prior to commencing an action.

The issues

surrounding this problem were explained as early as 1953 by the
Tennessee Supreme Court in Gibbons
Accident

Association,

v.

Mutual

Ben.

Health

259 S.W. 2d 653 (Tenn. 1953).

In

and
Gibbons,

an insured made a claim upon his insurer for disability payments.
The insurer denied the claims on the basis of application fraud
and offered to settle for $500.00. Gibbons agreed to this amount
and signed a release.

He then tried to set aside the release on

the grounds that at the time he signed it he was sick, and
"greatly disturbed" by his physical condition.

The trial court

required Gibbons to return the $500.00 before commencing suit.
Gibbons refused.

On appeal, Gibbons contended that he did not

need to tender ba:k the $500.00 because he alleged his damages
were in excess of this sum.

The court dismissed this argument

because it was only a conclusion of the Complaint and not a
proven fact.

The court stated that if the defendant admitted

owing a certain amount, then that amount could be retained.
However, it held that in cases where the dispute is for an
9

unliquidated claim relating to personal injuries, that the prior
settlement must be returned as a condition precedent to allowing
any action to proceed.

In reaching its conclusion, the court

quoted from 134 ALR, p. 108 where it is stated as follows:
Where it is sought to avoid a settlement or
release of a claim under an insurance policy
or fraternal benefit certificate, a return or
tender of the consideration paid for the
release or settlement is a condition
precedent to the granting of the relief.
Id.

at 654.
The Gibbons

court also referred to 1 CJS Accord and

Satisfaction § 70, p. 567, which is also quoted in the
plaintiff's Brief.

The plaintiff did not quote the general rule

which applies to this case.

It is as follows:

Ordinarily, where an accord is fully executed
so that there is both accord and
satisfaction, one party cannot have the
accord and satisfaction avoided, rescinded,
or set aside on the ground of fraud or
mistake unless he first restores or offers to
restore what he has received.
1 CJS Accord and Satisfaction § 70 at p. 567.
A number of courts in other jurisdictions have reached
the same conclusion as the Tennessee Supreme Court.
Nauman Vandervoort,

Inc.,

Melick

v.

220 N.W. 2d 748, 752 (Mich. App. 1974).

(In regards to unliquidated claims, one seeking to avoid an
accord and satisfaction must tender back amounts already paid
pursuant to the accord and satisfaction, thus returning both
10

parties to status quo before instituting suit.)
Home Insurance

Co.,

Poole

v. The

75 So. 2d 385, 389 (La. App. 1954).

(Good

pleading and regularity requires that in suits nullifying an
accord and satisfaction, the party will resort to a rescission
action and the amount received shall be tendered or deposited
back.

Drew v. Lyle,

76 S.E. 2d 142 (Ga. App. 1953).

(A claim

for personal injuries is unliquidated, and therefore plaintiff
cannot set aside a written release without first repaying prior
settlement sums.)

POINT III
THE ASHWORTH CLAIM WAS UNLIQUIDATED AND DISPUTED
THEREFORE THE PLAINTIFF'S AUTHORITY IS INAPPLICABLE
The plaintiff in her brief cites a number of
authorities for her claim that she does not need to refund the
settlement funds.

The plaintiff's first quotation is from 1 CJS

Accord and Satisfaction § 70, p. 568, which follows the quote
stated above.

In this quotation it is noted that where the

plaintiff "is in any event entitled to the amount received by
him," as the amount does not exceed that which is admitted or
conceded to be due, then the general rule requiring the return of
prior payments does not apply.
Liability is disputed on the record.

The plaintiff

submitted an affidavit containing allegations as to the events
11

surrounding the accident.

Otherwise, there is nothing on the

record to indicate how the accident occurred, why the defendants'
actions were improper, or any admissions of any type. Therefore,
there has been no determination that the plaintiff is entitled to
any sum.
Even if it is determined for the purposes of this legal
decision that the plaintiff should prevail on the liability
issues, the plaintiff's damages are unliquidated.
is making a claim for personal injuries.

The plaintiff

She incurred the sum of

$3,262.39 in medical expenses which included payment for various
diagnostic tests.

She allegedly was scheduled to incur an

additional $670.51 in medical expenses.

The plaintiff has argued

that this amount of special damages requires that she be given a
minimum settlement of $11,798.70. The plaintiff arrived at this
sum by multiplying her special damages by three (3). The
plaintiff states that this proposition is "usual customary,
notorious and widely known in the territorial jurisdiction of
this court."

However she cites no authority for this

proposition.

The Utah Supreme Court held where personal injuries

are involved "there is no set formula to compute the amount of
damages."

Jorgensen

v. Gonzales,

14 Utah 2d 330, 383 P.2d 934

(1963) .
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If this court was to hold that all parties are entitled
to a settlement equalling three times their medical expenses,
although this might simplify personal injury cases, it will
probably be frowned upon by lawyers representing both plaintiffs
and defendants.

In fact, lawyers, judges, plaintiffs, and

insurance adjusters, all have their own formulas and their own
personal opinion of the value of each case.

To hold in this case

that the plaintiff is entitled to a minimum recovery of
$11,798.00 is totally without support and would cause havoc in
the legal system.
All of the Utah cases cited by the plaintiff rely on
the theory that the party seeking to set aside ci release was
entitled to the amount that was paid.
case of Reliable
Under.,

Furniture

The plaintiff cites the

Co. v. Fidelity

16 Utah 211, 398 P.2d 685 (1965).

and Guaranty

Insurance

In Reliable

Furniture,

the defendant made a claim for $84,92 3.58 for a destruction loss.
The plaintiff claimed that his insurer, the defendant, "shoved a
paper in this face" and then forced him into a settlement.

The

plaintiff alleged that his insurer knew he could not continue his
business without any money, took advantage of his "plight",
falsely represented it could not deliver any more money, and then
wrongfully refused to deliver more than $12,000.

The plaintiff

claimed that this constituted a fraudulent action which required
13

the settlement to be set aside.

In addition, the plaintiff

presented the defendant's own calculations which showed that it
was undisputed that he was entitled to $12,000. A summary
judgment was denied if the plaintiff agreed to return the
$12,000.

On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court reversed this order

and held that since the record showed that the $12,000 sum was
"not in dispute", and further that since the plaintiff had
claimed a fraud, the plaintiff was not required to return the
funds as a condition precedent to proceeding.
The same case reappeared on appeal in 1970, and was at
that time named Reliable

Co.,

Furniture

In Reliable

466 P.2d 368 (Utah 1970).

matter had gone to trial.

Co. v.

American

Furniture

Home

II,

Assur.

the

The plaintiff presented evidence on

the fraud issue in an attempt to set aside the release. A
directed verdict was awarded to the defendant.
Utah Supreme Court affirmed.

On appeal the

The court held that where one has

accepted the settlement of a disputed claim in writing and cashed
a settlement check, that there is an accord and satisfaction, and
thus the plaintiff must show clear and convincing evidence as to
why no settlement was reached.

The court noted in this regard

that the plaintiff was an intelligent man with business
experience, that he held a $12,000 check for nine days, and that
he had ample opportunity to check on the settlement with an
14

attorney.

Thus the court held that there was no coercion, and

the settlement was allowed to stand.

The court noted that the

check stated that it was "payment in full", which although it did
not completely settle the obligation between the parties, was
proof that a settlement had been reached.
The other primary case cited by the plaintiff, Ralph A.
Badger,

Inc.

v. Fidelity

Building

and Loan Association,

94 Utah

97, 75 P.2d 669 (1938) revolved around a payment for an
undisputed claim.

In Badger,

the plaintiff was seeking to be

repaid for certain certificates and stock statements.

There was

no dispute that the plaintiff was owed the sum of $1,250.

The

dispute arose as to whether this money had to be repaid prior to
allowing any litigation to proceed.

The court noted that since

it was stipulated that the $1,250 was owed to the plaintiff,
there was no reason for it to repay the money before allowing the
litigation to go further.
The plaintiff also included in her brief a quote from
the case of Coke v. Timby,

57 Utah 53, 192 P.624 (1920) which

involved a situation where a payment was tendered to the
defendant in open court and refused.

The court noted that since

the payment was refused there was no further condition precedent
to be met.

15

The case at hand is distinguishable from all the above
cases.

First, the plaintiff has not alleged any fraud occurred.

Fraud must be pled with particularity.
Procedure 9(b).)

(Utah Rules of Civil

The plaintiff did not do so.

It was not

alleged that the defendants' insurer took advantage of some
knowledge they had of her condition.

Instead, she has merely

alleged that she accepted a settlement for an injury, the injury
then continued, and now she wants to set aside the claim for
economic reasons.

The fact that she may have been economically

stressed when accepting the settlement would be an insufficient
reason to set aside her agreement.
Ltd.,

Ill

Berujbe v. Fashion

Centre,,

P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989).
This case does not involve an undisputed claim.

are no calculations on the record as in Reliable

Furniture

There
which

indicate by the defendant's own agreement that the plaintiff is
entitled to the amount that was tendered.
in the record as in Badger,

There is no notation

that it is agreed that a certain sum

is owed by the defendants to the plaintiff.

Instead, the

plaintiff and defendant were involved in litigation over an
unliquidated personal injury claim.
that claim.

Payment was made to resolve

That payment was accepted, received, and negotiated.

Therefore, none of the Utah cases are applicable to this
situation, and instead the court should look to the general rule
16

as cited in other jurisdictions, in the ALR annotation, and in
the CJS treatise, and hold that the trial court's ruling was
correct.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER DOES NOT VIOLATE
ANY SECTION OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION
The plaintiff has alleged that the requirement to repay
the settlement proceeds violates the open court's provision of
the Utah Constitution.
position.

The plaintiff cites no authority for this

The plaintiff argues that this was a constitutional

violation because she was required to make a payment before
proceeding.,

The plaintiff was not barred from the courts, but

was required to meet a condition precedent before being allowed
to proceed,

The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the Utah Code

contain many such precedent conditions.

Included in these are

the necessity of filing a bond, filing certain notices, and
making certain payments.

The plaintiff was required to file a

$75.00 fee before commencing this action.
the money she was ordered to repay.

She had full use of

Therefore, there is no

Constitutional violation in requiring the plaintiff to repay any
sum.

17

POINT V
THIS COURT COULD AFFIRM JUDGE DANIELS'
RULING ON THE BASIS THAT THE PARTIES
REACHED AN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION
This court is allowed to look past Judge Daniels'
ruling and affirm his decision for any reason.
Unlimited,

Inc.

v. Copper State

743 (Utah 1990).

Thrift

& Loan Co.,

Projects
798 P.2d 738,

The defendants alleged that an accord and

satisfaction occurred, and it should not be set aside.

This

court could re-examine that issue, and dismiss the Complaint on
the basis of an accord and satisfaction.
The Utah Supreme Court thoroughly discussed the
doctrine of accord and satisfaction in Blackhurst
Insurance

Co.,

699 P.2d 688 (Utah 1985).

v.

In Blackhurst,

Transamerica
Mrs.

Blackhurst was involved in an accident with Leila Shipp, a
Transamerica insured.

Transamerica, through its adjuster, began

negotiations with the plaintiff's attorney.
was reached.

An oral agreement

The agreement was confirmed by letter, and it was

agreed that since Mrs. Blackhurst was incompetent as a result of
the accident, that a probate file would be set up to finalize the
settlement.
finalized.

Mrs. Blackhurst died before the probate could be
Mrs. Shipp's insurer tried to disavow the settlement.

The trial court held the oral agreement was enforceable and that
18

the settlement would stand.
affirmed.

On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court

The court noted that the oral agreement between the

parties was a completed contract and that as such was valid and
enforceable*.

The court stated that what was involved was an

accord and satisfaction.

The court defined this as follows:

"An

accord is an agreement between the parties, one to give or
perform, the other to receive or accept, such agreed payment for
performance in satisfaction of a claim.11
Transamerica

Insurance

Co. v. Holmquist,

Co.,

Blackhurst

v.

at 692, quoting Lawrence

642 P.2d 382, 384 (Utah 1982).

Construction

The court then

held that the agreement was enforceable, and rejected the
argument that the settlement was only conditional because the
court's appointment of a guardian had to be resolved.
An oral agreement involving an accord and satisfaction
was also involved in Lawrence

P.2d 382 (Utah 1982).

Construction

In Lawrence

Co.

Construction,

v.

Holmquist,

642

an action was

commenced by a general contractor to foreclose on a mechanics
lien.

During the course of litigation negotiations ensued.

agreement was reached to settle the matter.

The agreement was

set down in writing and delivered to counsel.
then refused to honor the settlement.
motion to enforce the settlement.
Court affirmed.

One of the parties

The trial court granted a

On appeal the Utah Supreme

The Utah Supreme Court noted that an oral
19

An

contract had been entered into between the parties to settle the
claim.

The court noted that the stipulation and letter were

evidence of the agreement, but did not prevent the oral agreement
from binding the parties.

Instead, the court held that the oral

executory accord was a valid settlement of the claim.

It set out

the elements that should be reviewed to determine if such an
accord had been reached as follows:

Lawrence

1.

A proper subject matter;

2.

Competent parties;

3.

An assent or meeting of the minds
of the parties;

4.

Consideration given for the accord.

v. Holmquist.

Id.

at 384.

The elements stated in Lawrence
met in this situation.
subject matter.
decisions.

Construction

were all

The settlement of the claim was a proper

The plaintiff is a competent adult who can make

An agreement was reached between the parties to pay

the sum of $5,170.51 in return for the signing of a release.

The

consideration given was the $5,170.51 which was taken and spent.
The check noted it was a full and final payment.

The plaintiff

waited ten and one-half months before deciding to file suit.
This indicates that the plaintiff and Allstate had a meeting of
the minds and an agreement.

Therefore, in conclusion, the

defendants assert that this matter was fully settled and that an
20

accord and satisfaction occurred.

This court would therefore be

properly justified in upholding Judge Daniels' ruling dismissing
this case.

CONCLUSION
The plaintiff made a bargain.

She now appears to be

saying that this was a bad bargain and she wants more money to
settle her personal injury claim.

However, sh€» is not willing to

set aside this bargain, but instead wants to k€»ep the fruits of
her alleged bad bargain, yet seek additional compensation.
The insurer for the defendants perhaps made a mistake
in allowing the plaintiff to receive the funds without making her
immediately sign a release.

However, even with a release the

plaintiff could still raise the same concerns.

She might state

that she was not in agreement with what happened or that she had
made a mistake.

A court in such a situation would tell her that

if she wanted to rescind her release that she must return the
settlement funds and start over.

This is what was done in this

case.
Precedent supports Judge Daniels7 ruling.

A plaintiff

must return funds she is not entitled to before commencing
litigation such as in this case.
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Defendant respectfully requests in conclusion that this
court enter an order upholding Judge Daniels' ruling and allowing
the dismissal with prejudice.
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